


SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DOCTRINE IN HAITI



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SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DOCTRINE IN HAITI

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ROBERT C. SHAW, MAJ, USA  
B.A., THE CITADEL, CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1996

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DOCTRINE IN HAITI by MAJ Robert C. Shaw, USA,  
80 pages.

This study investigates the role and appropriateness of Special Operations Forces (SOF) doctrine in Haiti during the planning of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1993 through 1995. The study reviews the current SOF and joint doctrine available to planners for the planning of these operations. It also includes a review of the organizations that were involved in the operation.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY provides a recent and complicated operation in which to study SOF doctrine. An operation in which all of the services were involved and one that included a major role for SOF planners from direct action missions to foreign internal defense missions. This case study also provides the opportunity to investigate the relationship between the current SOF doctrine written and what is actually used by the planners to accomplish their tasks at different levels.

This study promotes the use of the current SOF doctrine but amplifies the need to increase its study and usage by conventional minded planners. It also concludes that Special Operations Forces Doctrine requires frequent updating as new SOF capabilities and roles continue to change.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Success in joint and combined military operations requires bringing to bear, at the right times and places, the unique and complementary capabilities of each of the Services.<sup>1</sup>

John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995

Doctrine is a basis for success in military operations, and it must remain broad and flexible to accommodate the full range of required missions. Operations in Haiti (1993 to 1995) provide an opportunity to study Special Operations Forces (SOF) doctrine as it relates to joint and combined operations.

This study focuses on the SOF doctrine used in planning these operations and attempts to ascertain whether or not the current doctrine was appropriate in Haiti. During these joint and combined operations, missions dictated the integration of SOF into almost every level of command.

This integration of SOF into the planning and execution of the operations was sometimes extremely difficult. The problem for the SOF planners seems to be an overall lack of understanding of SOF by the conventional forces. This problem exists at several levels and includes its capabilities and most importantly SOF doctrine with respect to joint and combined force structures. Moreover, the constantly changing environment for use of the United States SOF and the new missions they portend requires that the doctrine for these forces also change.

In a statement presented to the committees and subcommittees of the United States House of Representatives in February 1995, The Honorable Togo D. West and General Gordon R. Sullivan wrote:

Doctrine - the statement of how America's Army, as a member of the joint team, intends to conduct war and military operations other than war - is the Army's engine of change. Intellectual change occurs first, followed by organizational and physical change. Doctrine facilitates communications within the Army, establishes a shared professional culture and approach to operations, and serves as the basis for curriculum in the Army school system.<sup>2</sup>

Permeating the entire Army organizational structure, and setting the direction for organization and the standard for leadership development and soldier training, doctrine must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide.<sup>3</sup>

The current doctrine may need to change in order to meet the future SOF requirements for military operations. Operations in Haiti are useful to study with respect to doctrinal changes because they are one of the recent operations planned for and executed with current SOF doctrine.

There are about 100 joint publications applicable to military operations other than war (MOOTW) in print or being written at this time, of which the Army is the lead agent for 26.<sup>4</sup> These are the fundamental documents that provide direction for the Army in joint operations, warfighting, and MOOTW. The current SOF documents may or may not be appropriate for the integration of SOF into joint and combined operations as in Haiti. By studying the current documents and their impact or lack of impact on the planning and execution of recent joint SOF operations in Haiti, this thesis addresses the question of whether or not the doctrine is appropriate for current and future operations planning and execution.

### Background

Haiti has been a concern for the United States for many years. The President of the United States George Bush mentioned the 1990 election of the Haitian democratic government in the 1991 National Security Strategy.<sup>5</sup> This reference is one of the first (since 1915) that officially identifies democracy in Haiti as a U.S. national interest. The already fragile democracy in Haiti was broken when the President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was deposed a mere seven months after his election. The United States immediately began reviewing options to restore democracy to Haiti.

There were several plans with varying degrees of military involvement formulated to address the problems in Haiti. Each of these plans had a common thread woven through them that called for some SOF involvement. In fact, there was a stand-alone joint plan that was totally SOF. SOF was integrated from the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) level down through the Joint Task Force (JTF) level, the Joint Special Operations Task Force level, and the combined force level with respect to integration into missions of the 18th Airborne Corps and the 10th Mountain Division.

The problem of creating a dynamic doctrine for Special Operations Forces is key when the set of doctrinal functions change as fast as they do. In Haiti, the mission changed in a matter of minutes during the actual deployment of the invasion force. The change in mission from an attack to restore democracy to a landing of forces in order to support democracy created a distinct change in the set of functions required to accomplish the new mission.

In the "From the Commandant" section of the October 1995 issue of Special Warfare, the professional journal of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Major General William F. Garrison notes that the entire issue focuses on the required steps that should be taken in terms of doctrine, force structure, and theory to prepare for the future. Articles within the issue include Major General Sidney Shachnow and Colonel Glenn Harned discussing the possible changes in force structure and doctrine respectively.<sup>6</sup> The issue of change is important to everyone in the Special Operations field as Major General Garrison states:

Changes to doctrine and force structure have long-reaching effects and should be made judiciously. But we should not allow our reluctance to change to interfere with the need to adapt to changes in our operational environment and in the nature of warfare. As Sidney Shachnow says in his article, "Of all our human resources, the most precious is the desire to improve."<sup>7</sup>

These articles and statements by the current senior leaders of the SOF community acknowledge the need to prepare for the future and in terms of doctrine not only stay current, but look forward into the future. These leaders call for doctrine writers to skillfully change and improve SOF doctrine in terms of the functions, missions, and requirements of the future.

SOF doctrine is dynamic because of new technology and better capabilities of the forces. This doctrinal change must continue, but within the context of integrated operations with other forces. But, Haiti is only one example of how the SOF doctrine can set the stage for and become a tool which is used to develop the plans.

Other joint and combined forces need to be able to rely on this doctrine for their own education to ensure that SOF is integrated correctly into the operation and that the result is a common accomplishment of the stated mission. SOF can be a force multiplier to a company of light infantry or a joint task force (JTF), or it can be a commander's worst nightmare when it comes to trying to figure out how to use the SOF assets he has available.

As a planner in the early stages of operations in Haiti, I witnessed SOF planning efforts initially focused on such types of MOOTW as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations (support), and SOF principal missions, such as direct action (DA), unconventional warfare (UW), and special reconnaissance (SR). These plans were originally tailored for forcible entry to restore the democratically elected Haitian government. The functions of the missions changed, forcing SOF to adapt to a peaceful entry without opposition to implement an agreement between the United States and the de facto government.<sup>8</sup> The initial combat missions and contingency operations turned into other MOOTW when the invasion was called off. SOF adapted and began planning to conduct peace operations, humanitarian assistance, show of force, foreign internal defense (FID), and others. The successful transition proved the operational flexibility of SOF. Initially, the use of Army SOF was planned as a separate follow-on force with primary missions in the MOOTW category. Because of the invasion cancellation, these same MOOTW quickly became the main focus of the overall operation following the initial entry by the 10th Mountain Division forces.

One of the difficulties with doctrine is the sometimes confusing or misunderstood terminology itself. As of this writing, the

operational categories of operations other than war (OOTW) and MOOTW are being changed to one of several alternatives.<sup>9</sup> This example of change is an important step in clarifying and moving ahead with concise and universally understood terminology.

#### Importance of the Problem

In a memorandum dated November 25, 1994, and signed by Lieutenant General Walter Kross, USAF, Director, Joint Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili directed that the doctrinal concept found in the preface of all joint publications be changed to read:

The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.<sup>10</sup>

This order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili shows, the importance he places on joint doctrine and on the use of this doctrine by everyone in the joint community. Although there can be separate service special operations missions, most SOF planning and execution is joint in nature.

At flag-level planning sessions, I witnessed questions to the SOF representatives which showed that although current doctrine used for planning by SOF may be understood by the SOF community, it clearly is not so well understood by many others. Many questions reflected an outdated perspective, even though these questions often related to current SOF capabilities.

SOF must be able to keep its doctrine current with advances in technology and methodology because of the environment in which SOF

operates. The constant changes in missions and functions like those of MOOTW call for a dynamic and flexible doctrine. The future success of SOF is directly related to the continued improvement of its doctrine and careful changes to its doctrine to meet the challenges of the operational environment of tomorrow.

SOF doctrine has become less restrictive in many ways. Over the past ten years SOF doctrine has become more "user friendly" for conventional forces, but it is still sometimes misunderstood. Although classified portions remain, the majority of SOF doctrine can be discussed in open forum. In the past the doctrine or sometimes just standard operating procedures (SOPs) were classified and specific to the special operations units and the special equipment they had. These were often very detailed and well developed. However, as officers rotated out to other assignments they took with them the doctrinal knowledge. They also took with them the historical background of the doctrine. This background required to develop the doctrine remained with the noncommissioned officers who tended to stay in the special unit assignments. Today, many officers rotate back into the special units after professional schooling assignments or other conventional assignments. This provides the SOF community the ability to educate officers at lower levels of responsibility and return them to SOF units years later with higher responsibility and at least a background in SOF doctrine.

The doctrine must remain dynamic because of the increase in missions that combine SOF with conventional, general purpose forces

(GPF). In the past, the SOF community was called upon to conduct missions that required a unique capability, usually a small unit to accomplish a limited task. Many of the SOF units were designed for direct action (DA) missions requiring a surgical approach or execution. Today, a SOF unit or task force may be the entree for other forces or be called upon to conduct the surgical mission before, during, or after an established conflict. This integration requires a basic knowledge of SOF doctrine by the supported force planners and the appropriate doctrine required by the SOF units to integrate themselves into the conventional force and accomplish their mission.

As the weapons systems, equipment, vehicles, and technologies change so do the tactics and planning considerations. The development of a sophisticated, deployable satellite communications capability for SOF has brought about a major change in a unit's ability to communicate faster, more clearly, and with an increase with quantity and quality data that can be sent almost anywhere in the world in near-real-time speed. This capability also offers the commanders of the conventional forces a better picture of the changing battlefield. Now more than ever, planners and commanders receive information and intelligence from SOF they may never have thought possible before.

The SOF doctrine needs to reflect the use, management, distribution, and procedures to plan for operations with joint and combined units. SOF doctrine should ensure that all requirements are addressed and that there is a way for joint and combined units to benefit from the fieldwork SOF units accomplish. Many of the recent operations called for SOF to enhance the joint and combined units already on the ground. Today, the SOF community has developed the concept of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) as a separate element to provide centralized operational control (OPCON) or

direction of assigned and attached U.S. forces within a unified commander's area of responsibility (AOR). If a combined force is involved the JSOTF becomes a CSOTF or Combined Special Operations Task Force.

Each of the regional commanders in chief (CINC) has a special operations command (SOC) assigned to plan the use of SOF in their respective AOR. Other recent changes to SOF doctrine include a Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD) to coordinate and advise a U.S. Army corps commander on Army SOF capabilities (except Civil Affairs, G-5 and Psychological Operations, G-3) issues and a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) that provides command and control or coordination of special purpose forces (SPF) within a corps AOR.<sup>11</sup> Both Navy SEALS, the Naval Special Operations arm, and the Air Force Special Operations units have representation and coordinating elements at the SOC level and most times have organic representation for planning within the Joint SOC staff itself.

In the past, a SOF commander might have set up his own camp away from the supported units, but now almost total integration is necessary to fulfill the requirements of the mission. This is because of the nature of many of our current missions. More often than not it is necessary for a SOF commander to integrate his forces with a conventional force to best complete the tasks assigned. Therefore, it is very important to research and examine the evidence to determine the appropriateness of the SOF doctrine to today's operations such as in Haiti.

This thesis examines the need to improve the current SOF doctrine and test the doctrine of the conventional and joint forces to see whether they address the integration of SOF sufficiently and correctly. From what I have personally witnessed during the planning of

these operations I developed the hypothesis that the current SOF doctrine may not be appropriate for operations such as in Haiti. However, the results of this thesis may show deficiencies exist in the joint or combined force doctrine as opposed to the SOF doctrine.

#### Key Definitions

The following paragraphs will describe and define the key terminology (key terms are underlined in this thesis for clarity) unique to SOF. A more complete list of terms can be found in the Joint Publication 3.05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Draft), 28 February 1995; Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Joint Terms; The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993.

Special operations refers to operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial-operations forces.<sup>12</sup>

"Conventional forces are those forces capable of conventional operations using nonnuclear weapons. These units include a majority of United States forces. Joint forces are those forces of two or more Services."<sup>13</sup> "Combined forces are two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies."<sup>14</sup>

The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is a joint task force comprised of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operations or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.<sup>15</sup>

The term "force multiplier" is an element that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhancing the probability of successful mission accomplishment.<sup>16</sup>

The country team is a term used to describe the group of senior members of all U.S. official organizations in a foreign country, headed by the ambassador or principal U.S. diplomatic representative. Members commonly include The State Department, military and CIA.<sup>17</sup>

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations were both important missions conducted in Haiti by U.S. forces.

Civil Affairs is defined as the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These

activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.<sup>18</sup>

Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. It is also commonly called PSYOP.<sup>19</sup>

The following definitions of types of missions or peace operations are also mentioned in this thesis and will be important for the reader to understand the military meaning of the terms.

Peacekeeping refers to non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that outside forces undertake with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to a dispute.<sup>20</sup>

Peacemaking is the process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that may include military peace operations.<sup>21</sup>

Peace enforcement is a form of combat, armed intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention that, in most cases, is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions. The primary purpose of peace enforcement is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community. Peace enforcement operations may

include post-conflict restoration and reconstitution-assistance missions such as the following: Enforcement of sanctions, protection of the human rights of minorities, Protection of humanitarian relief efforts, Guaranteeing or limiting freedom of movement, Restoration of territorial integrity, Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS).<sup>22</sup>

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.<sup>23</sup>

As the terms OOTW and MOOTW come under increased scrutiny, other terms and new terminology are being developed and changed to fit military operations. Some of these terms such as civic action, military civic action, and peacebuilding are constantly being used by politicians and military officials alike with respect to military application. However, the lack of concise definitions prevents them from being published in the doctrine. One would think that the term civic action might be defined in Joint Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, but it is not. In fact, peacebuilding is not defined in that publication, but page II-13 of Joint Pub 3-57 explains the operational continuum in terms of three states (peacetime competition, conflict, and war). This is just one example of some of the terminology now used in relation to military operations today that is not yet precisely defined in the current doctrine.

The term military civic action is one of the terms that is precisely defined. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, currently being reviewed under a new title "Stability and Support Operations," defines military civic action as:

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populace at all levels in fields such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JCS Pub 1-02).<sup>24</sup>

Topic

The topic of this thesis is the appropriateness of current SOF doctrine in today's military operations when SOF forces are integrated into joint and combined forces. This thesis will answer the question: Is current Special Operations Forces doctrine appropriate for joint and combined operations, such as in operations in Haiti (1993 to 1995)? Within this thesis several subordinate questions will be answered in order to better focus the conclusions: What is the current SOF doctrine? How does it relate to the integration with conventional Joint forces? Does the current doctrine provide the best support for all planners involved including the J2 and J3 at different levels? What were the roles of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Special Operations Command Atlantic (SOCLANT), the Joint Task Force (JTF), and others in Haiti? Was the intelligence support managed properly with respect to the doctrine? Does the doctrine need to change? This thesis begins by examining the available doctrine and answering these secondary questions, and concludes with an answer to the proposed research question.

Limitations and Delimitations

The research for this thesis includes an in-depth review of available documents and other sources that define the current doctrine for SOF and the integration of SOF at the Atlantic Command (ACOM), the 18th Airborne Corps, and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) level. It also covers the political and military events from roughly 1993 through 1995 (current as of this writing).

A good portion of the research for this thesis will be primary source research. This required a detailed initial search for

documents, sometimes from the originators themselves. Initially it was thought the amount of research items may be limited in number and would force the research to be extremely specific to the questions relating to this thesis. However, this was not the case. Although there is not very much written on this topic, there was sufficient documentation to study.

As mentioned above there was a stand alone SOF plan to invade Haiti. Although the basis of the planning and execution of the stand alone SOF plan was the current doctrine, the research of this particular plan will be confined to general propositions. Prohibitions, such as the level of classification of the material (given the unclassified nature of this thesis), prevent the discussion of this plan in detail. In any case, this stand alone special SOF plan would probably not provide the answers to the questions raised in this thesis with regard to the appropriateness of SOF doctrine concerning joint and combined forces. The plan was developed generally without extensive integration of other joint or combined forces except in terms of battle hand-over.

#### Research Approach

The research approach studies the doctrine of the SOF involved in Haiti including the doctrine of the conventional, joint, and combined forces. The thesis describes the doctrine for each of these elements and compares the existing doctrine to the actual adherence and use of the doctrine in the planning efforts that were required for operations in Haiti. The thesis studies adherence to doctrine by reviewing the actual plans that integrated SOF with the other joint and conventional forces. The research also includes a detailed study of the operational planning guidance given to commanders and the operations orders they approved.

The analysis concentrates on those principles, techniques, tactics, and procedures that SOF is supposed to use to plan and execute operations. It also examines how the conventional forces used SOF in the planning and execution of their operations. Most important in this regard, the use of SOF joint doctrine by conventional planners provides an indicator of the weaknesses of current SOF doctrine. It is important to have the correct and appropriate doctrine in print, yet it is quite another thing to correctly use this doctrine and the principles, techniques, tactics, and procedures it provides.

This thesis researches the size and components of the planning and liaison cells at the ACOM, Corps, and tactical levels to ascertain whether the staffs were manned correctly and whether the appropriate coordination was made for the operations. The thesis also reviews the planning documents of the different levels of operations to determine whether the coordination was appropriate according to current doctrine in terms of both conventional and SOF requirements.

#### Anticipated Outcome

This study should show that there is a need to review, update and continue to update more frequently current SOF doctrine, and possibly change the specific elements of current SOF doctrine. This could lead to adding a liaison officer (LNO) or section to different levels for conventional planning and joint organizations for special operations. This study focuses on the correct types of representation between the units and the Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD) or the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). It appears the SOCOORD were not correctly used. These coordinating elements seem to be very important in concept, but it is possible these

elements were not properly defined, staffed, or given the proper guidance with respect to the current doctrine.

The answers to the initial questions of this thesis lead to an answer to the thesis question. The results of this thesis has the potential to recommend changes in the way the joint SOF units train, plan, or execute their missions. The discovery of inappropriate doctrine could lead to a change in the way conventional forces train, plan or execute operations with SOF or joint forces. This thesis provides a study of the current doctrine with respect to the recent joint and combined operation in Haiti to show that doctrine for SOF may or may not have been appropriate for the operation or future operations as in Haiti. There will probably be some relationship to the current doctrine that will show the requirement for change.

As one of the initial studies of operations in Haiti, the primary research conducted will assist others in similar efforts to study the historic, military, political, or other aspects of this operation. The analysis conducted will be of importance to the SOF community and to other researchers interested in this topic.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 14.

<sup>2</sup>Togo D. West, and General Gordan R. Sullivan. United States Army Posture Statement, FY 96, Selected Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1995, 104th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 34.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. <sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>George Bush, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 1991), 8.

<sup>6</sup>Articles on Doctrine written by Major General Sidney Shachnow and Colonel Glenn Harned, "As I remember It: Notional 'X' Command" and "Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?" respectively, Special Warfare, The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, October 1995, 10-17.

<sup>7</sup>Major General William F. Garrison, "From the Commandant," Special Warfare, October 1995, inside front cover.

<sup>8</sup>West, 112.

<sup>9</sup>See the series of TRADOC messages from December 1995 to the present on this subject.

<sup>10</sup>CJCS, General John M. Shalikashvili, directed that the doctrinal guidance presented in all joint publications be authoritative. Only in cases of exceptional circumstances or when the judgment of the commander dictates otherwise should this joint doctrine not be followed.

<sup>11</sup>Battle Command Training Program Presentation (BCTP), Briefing Slides from lecture, Army Special Operations Forces (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: BCTP, November 1995).

<sup>12</sup>Joint PUB 3.05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 28 February 1995), 110.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 91.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 99.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 94.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 92.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 89.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 107.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 106.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 94.

<sup>24</sup>FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict  
(Washington, DC: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force  
5 December 1990), Glossary-5.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND CURRENT DOCTRINAL BASE

The literature and research material for this thesis includes the base planning documents for the different forces operating in Haiti from 1993 to 1995. This thesis also reviews and studies the current doctrine for each of these forces and will cite the latest versions (or in some cases the draft versions) of current doctrine. However, it is important not to base any conclusions upon draft documents. Nevertheless, this thesis cites them because of their influence on current trends and to illustrate the dynamic nature of the doctrine on which this study focuses. The doctrine studied is the base upon which a comparison is made to see if and how it was used or followed with respect to the other forces. This comparison helps to determine whether current doctrine is appropriate. Other documents, such as the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, will be used to provide the overall backdrop for the eventual development of the current and future doctrine. After-action reports and comments from commanders and staffs point out specific problems with respect to their role or position during the Haiti operations.

Research interviews conducted in Haiti in January 1996 with the current commanders and staffs helped determine whether the doctrine was adequate to plan and to conduct the operations during the first days of the mission. The interviews also assisted in determining if there were any changes made to doctrine that came about as a direct result of the operations.

The lessons learned data bases from joint units and other available reports are studied to bring out some of the specific items relating to discussions in this thesis. Submissions of lessons learned by Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 and 190 explain the relationship and interoperability of both JTFs. This portion of the literature is studied specifically to determine the state of interoperability between the JTFs during the planning and execution of the operations in Haiti.

Because of the nature of this operation and the change of mission from invasion planning and forced entry to permissive entry, the review of this literature is important. Each of the units was in a different state of readiness and execution when the change in mission took place. This called for quick thinking and planning to change roles as quickly as they did. During this critical time, it is important to understand how doctrine helped or impeded the planning and to research how efficient the planning was in relation to the JTFs.

This thesis describes current doctrine to provide information for a better understanding of the terms and the problem. Because SOF and joint terminology is sometimes misunderstood by planners, the doctrinal definitions of terms provided in this thesis will assist the reader to relate to the conclusions this thesis reaches.

Once the joint force doctrine is presented, focus shifts to the main events in Haiti to provide knowledge on the historic aspects of this problem. This presentation is not comprehensive but is meant to provide only the necessary background information to describe the operations. It is a necessary part of the thesis because of the many political influences and military actions that took place forced the changes in military action and events in Haiti.

This thesis also reviews various briefing slides presented at the different levels of planning for these operations. The majority

of the planning guidance presented by different commanders can be examined through the presentation materials. My actual participation in many of these briefings adds to the information and provide any further background information.

As mentioned above, the sources of literature for this thesis are from the national policy level down through the military doctrinal level publications, field manuals, handbooks, orders, news articles, and reports presented throughout the period covered in this research. Because of my personal experience with the various levels planning these operations, I provide personal insight on the subjects at hand, as appropriate.

Although this thesis concentrates on SOF doctrine as it relates to operations in Haiti, it is imperative to outline the joint doctrine first. The next few pages describes the joint doctrine in the literature available to planners today. This provides a starting point to discuss the special operations doctrine and any comparisons or contrasting issues.

In order to understand the joint doctrine publications one needs to understand where doctrine for the armed forces comes from and how it is organized. The doctrine is developed by the combined efforts of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands as derived from operational experience, training, or evaluation. It starts with a project proposal or recommended change to doctrine and leads to a program directive. Normally, two doctrinal drafts are constructed before a test publication and evaluation is conducted. At that point the draft and the evaluation results are sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for approval and then, if approved, the draft is published as a Joint Publication. The final step is then an enhanced warfighting capability.<sup>1</sup> The Joint Publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy. The overall (highest) document is the

Joint Pub 1. Under this publication are various categories. Each category has its own numbering system: intelligence is numbered 2.0; operations is 3.0; logistics is 4.0; plans is 5.0; and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems is 6.0. Publications that fall under the each category heading begin with the whole number (of the category) and are followed by a decimal point and number in sequence. For instance, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations is numbered Joint Pub 3-07.3.

The base documents used, or that are supposed to be used, by the military to plan and to execute joint operations are described in doctrine. Doctrine is presented in the form of reference manuals that provide a guide for joint action by the armed forces. One of the most important doctrinal publications is Joint Pub 1. In the preface (p. iii) of this 11 November 1991 publication it is stated that the "concepts are broad and require a leader's judgment in its application."<sup>2</sup> The preface goes on to describe the future and nature of modern warfare as one that demands the United States Armed Forces to fight as a team. This preface also states "effective integration" of several or all of the armed forces under one commander "can provide an overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents."<sup>3</sup> This publication also discusses the reasons why the Army fights the way it does, the values that should be applied to joint teamwork, the fundamentals of joint warfare and the unifying focus for United States military operations and the joint campaign.

The importance of doctrine is summed up in a quote from General Curtis LeMay, USAF, "At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. . . . It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment."<sup>4</sup> Planners in the armed forces are

taught that doctrine is authoritative but not directive. This refers to the values that should be applied when implementing doctrine in military operations. These values as outlined in Joint Pub 1 are integrity, competence, physical courage, moral courage, risk taking, tenacity, and teamwork. Together these values should bring a balance to understanding and implementing the doctrines of the joint force consisting of air, sea and land forces.<sup>5</sup>

Some of the fundamentals mentioned in Joint Pub 1 are such things as simplicity and clarity of plan. The fact that a joint force was brought together during the operations in Haiti made for a complex endeavor in itself, not to mention the complexity built into the formation of two separate JTFs as with JTF 180 and JTF 190. It is useful to know whether clarity was a fundamental concern with respect to the plans and operations in Haiti and whether they were fully understood by all. This research will show that there is no such thing as perfect desemination of all information; however, there are doctrinal steps and procedures that should be followed to ensure that desemination of plans and, more importantly, the changes in current plans be published for all of the units involved.

Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, provides the overall doctrine for all Services to use in planning joint special operations and employment of SOF. Its purpose is to facilitate interoperability with conventional forces and between Service SOF. It also provides the foundation for the development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.<sup>6</sup>

Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (25 August 1993), provides doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the United States Armed Forces. It provides the guidance to JTF and combatant commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations

planning and training. It does not restrict the authority of the joint force commander from organizing and executing the mission in a manner deemed appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.<sup>7</sup> This is the main planning doctrinal document the JTF and special operations units should refer to when planning the operations in Haiti. It is interesting to note that there is a caveat in each of these doctrinal publications that permits the commander to use the appropriate judgment with each of these guides to best accomplish the mission. This simply provides the JTF or combatant commander with the required flexibility to conduct the planning, organization, and execution of the operation as deemed necessary to best accomplish the mission.

Another important part of this doctrine is its authoritative nature. If a conflict arises between the contents of the joint publications and the contents of Service publications, the joint publications will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided more current and specific guidance.<sup>8</sup> This may be relevant when a combatant commander is working with Service commands, who provide recruited, organized, trained, equipped forces for assignment to the commander. Service component commanders are subject to the orders of combatant commanders and subject to the combat commander's direction. Service component commanders are also responsible to the Military Departments and Services in their support and administrative responsibilities. Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 6, details, by law, the authority of combatant commanders for this purpose.<sup>9</sup>

Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (page iv), states that this document serves four purposes. First, it describes operational procedures for the joint functional Special Operations component of a joint force; second, it enhances the

coordination with the conventional components; third, it facilitates the training of assigned SOF; and finally, it improves joint interoperability and fosters awareness of SO. This one document provides most of the guidance to both the conventional and joint force staffs when required to plan operations with SO units.

Chapter 4 provides planners with detailed standards for planning that include the use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format for planning products. It also describes the deliberate planning process of the commander, special operations command (COMSOC), for deployment and employment of SOF and resources. One important part of this planning is to ensure that it is coordinated in all phases of theater-level planning to include strategy development and campaign planning. The first step is to develop a concept from a staff estimate and analysis of the mission. Next, the plan is developed with respect to forces, support, and transportation requirements. The plan is reviewed and the supporting plans are developed. If specific targeting selection is required, this is conducted next as a part of the supporting plan with the actual tactical force that will be used.<sup>10</sup>

Another type of planning described in this reference is time-sensitive planning, sometimes referred to crisis action planning because it is usually done in response to a specific situation. This process begins with course of action development that is integrated with the plans of the combatant commander. The next step is execution planning that begins with an order to initiate execution planning or an alert order that involves the deployment or employment of SOF.<sup>11</sup> Sometimes this is enhanced by refining an existing plan and thus saving valuable time.

The joint planning procedures are generally the same for peacetime planning. One major difference is the increased interagency

coordination. At this time there are no standardized coordination procedures for this type of planning.<sup>12</sup>

Once the courses of action are developed, the commanders begin an evaluation to decide which plan will be chosen. Once a plan has been chosen a briefback is conducted by the staff to the commander for final approval of the plan for execution. If there have been alterations to a chosen plan, a commander may dictate that other briefbacks be conducted to review the plan with the changes incorporated.<sup>13</sup>

Another type of briefing was used for the operations in Haiti. It was more of a combination rehearsal and decision briefing called a "rock drill." These types of briefings were usually presented to the theater Commander in Chief of United States Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) and the CJTF Commander. I attended three separate briefings of this type for Haiti at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the planning of these operations. These were very long and detailed briefings that synchronized the actions on a model built for the operational area with the key targets and objectives labeled for all to view. A timekeeper kept the briefing moving and ensured the timing of the events as they were run on an accelerated timeline. One of the most important reasons to conduct this type of briefing is for the commander to ensure the "deconfliction" of not only airspace, but other activities on the three dimensional battlefield. It also provides the commander and staff a visualization of the battle or operation prior to the actual execution.

There are two elements in Army doctrine used to ensure proper coordination of SOF in joint and conventional operations. The first one this thesis will discuss is the Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD). A SOCOORD is a staff cell usually within the corps G3 responsible for coordinating requirements for SO. The SOCOORD is a focal point to the C4 and intelligence (C4I) structure for synchronizing

SO activities in support of the corps missions.<sup>14</sup> The SOCOORD consists of one Special Forces (SF) lieutenant colonel (LTC), one SF major (MAJ), one Infantry Ranger captain (CPT) with Ranger regiment experience, one SF sergeant major (SGM). The SOCOORD is responsible for writing the SO annex to the corps plan, producing the SO staff estimate and "deconflicting" target lists and other coordinations that must be made.<sup>15</sup>

The Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCORD) Handbook draft, dated January 1992, does not show a relationship with a JTF or JSOTF. However, under a Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC) an Army Special Operations Task Force is usually under operational control (OPCON) which has a Special Operations Control Element (SOCCE) to coordinate with the SOCOORD. If, as in Haiti, the JTF is an Army corps, then there is already a SOCOORD within the staff. When activated a JSOTF maintains a liaison officer (LNO) or team of individuals with the JTF to maintain coordination and ensure continuity in the planning and execution of the operation.

The Special Operations Command and Control Element is usually an SF B team or company headquarters (ten personnel) commanded by a major. Depending on the situation, the SOCCE could be commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The SOCCE is responsible to the corps commander for conducting tactical operations center (TOC) functions and liaison between SOF commander and the general purpose force (GPF) commander. This element is not to be confused with a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The SOCCE has operational control of its assets and provides all of the elements of command minus the element of support for SOF. The SOCCE is not an operational base to launch or recover SOF. It is the coordinating element for these activities and can be co-located with the SOCOORD at corps level. This element is not a subordinated staff element to the corps or other command.<sup>16</sup>

Both of these elements are tools the commander has to ensure coordination and deconfliction of SOF related activities in the three-dimensional battlefield. The personnel in each of these elements should be trained in the functions they are responsible for. The best training these elements have is in day-to-day operations during exercises where they can hone the skills necessary to perform their duties efficiently.

The Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces, is the integrating manual for United States Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). This manual presents a description of missions and roles, the capabilities and organization, command and control, and employment and sustainment of ARSOF in all environments and all levels of war. This FM also serves the same purpose as FM 100-5 (1993 edition), Operations, for the conventional Army.<sup>17</sup> This is the primary doctrine and manual for ARSOF including information from the strategic level down through all types of ARSOF such as Ranger, SF, CA, Psyop and Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA). FM 100-25 is the main document for the theater ARSOF commander and staff. It is also recommended that the GPF commanders and staffs use this manual as a reference to obtain a broad understanding of ARSOF for planning and execution of joint and combined operations. This document provides the Special Operations Commander (SOC) with the details of how to divide up an operational area for responsibility and how to coordinate the SOF activities with the various other elements. This document is a key manual because it projects the ARSOF capabilities for planners at all levels out about six years, which would have included ARSOF capabilities for the operations in Haiti.<sup>18</sup>

Targeting is another issue that requires careful coordination and planning. Joint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations and Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, states in chapter III that during

deliberate special operations targeting and mission planning targets should be nominated by the component commanders and then approved by the combatant commander to support the operational plans.<sup>19</sup> This targeting process requires intensive coordination. The physical location of ground forces, such as reconnaissance elements, the airspace deconfliction between attack aircraft and others that may be in the area providing support; and potential fratricide concerns, must be coordinated and verified before execution. This is an extremely important part of the responsibilities of liaison officers and the elements noted above such as the SOCCORD and SOCCE for special operations. The fact that information is simply provided to another planner concerning targeting or other important information is sometimes not enough.

I learned this critical point while waiting to coordinate a communications plan and noticed an overlay with the right grid references for targeting, but the wrong observation post (OP) plotted on the map. This was eventually changed and was a human error on the part of the plotter. However, if this point had not been corrected it may have had serious implications for the soldiers in the OP during the attack.

This error is brought up in this thesis to show the importance of what the doctrine says and why. Above, it was stated that doctrine is written from experience and should be used with good judgment as a model, format, or guide for planners. One of the most important points to any planner is to check and recheck coordinations made.

Doctrine is the base all planners at all levels have to plan with. If variations from what the publications state are made, that also requires a point of coordination. The excuse that a doctrinal subject is not familiar to a specific Service is not acceptable. The publications are made available to all joint planners and this doctrine

is taught at all the senior Service Schools as well as the intermediate level staff colleges of each Service.

Granted, some of this doctrine is new, some emerging, and in fact is still in draft form. The drafts are usually the best available documents to reference and plan with and should be at least read for procedures or techniques for plans and execution. Joint doctrine drafts must be approved at the CJCS level and experience shows it usually takes a year or more for a document to make it through the process. Since it is the responsibility of the commander to ensure effective planning, drafts should be used if they are applicable. Of course, this should be done with the careful and prudent judgment of the commander in order to meet the mission requirements.

Commanders and planners employing joint SOF doctrine should adhere to the guidance in the applicable pub, but should pay particular attention to Joint Pub 3-05. This publication explains cases when SOF is applicable such as when nonmilitary options are insufficient, conventional options are clearly the wrong choice or infeasible, or when the National Command Authority (NCA) wants the operation conducted. Sometimes this may mean covert, clandestine operations or an operation with a critical demand for minimal collateral damage.<sup>20</sup>

The role of SOF is many times a supporting one to the GPF. However, when SOF is used as the main effort it can have significant political ramifications because it may be viewed as more critical than rigid military considerations. SOF can conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, or unconventional warfare operations. The use of SOF can and usually does have broad and long-lasting political implications. Therefore, the decision to use SOF is a critical one that may require the integration of operational security (OPSEC), communications security (COMSEC), cover stories, deception, and compartmentalization.<sup>21</sup>

A commander must also weigh the value of the target versus the risk to SOF personnel, and the potential for embarrassment to the nation or impact on the theater campaign.<sup>22</sup> Because SOF actions, such as direct action and special reconnaissance, can sometimes be short in duration, planning should include the follow-on conventional force coordinations. SOF and GPF during operations in Haiti were to have a simultaneous commitment of force to invade the country. Once the decision was made to enter peacefully, SOF took a supporting role for the GPF and a more intense role after the majority of GPF redeployed to continue the operations during peacetime.

Because the SOF operations in Haiti were joint in nature, it was necessary for the planners to accurately plan every detail of the operations. Some operations were planned at homestation and even aboard a ship at sea. These coordinations also often required close interagency coordination, which in turn called for a dependable, secure, redundant, C4 system as doctrine points out. Some of these SOF forces required special weapons and equipment to be employed with nonstandard configurations of personnel and equipment. Doctrine also points out that this requirement may lead to nonroutine methods of support that must be coordinated "face to face" early in the planning effort. SOF are employed best when centralized decisions are made and the environment permits decentralized planning and execution.<sup>23</sup>

Doctrine also calls for a broad range of options for maximum flexibility. These options must be rehearsed in real-time with real-distance detail and conducted in an environment closest to that of the actual mission site with all actual mission participants present.<sup>24</sup> This broad range of options and flexibility also requires accurate intelligence. Intelligence should be target specific and detailed, (usually more so than for conventional forces) and sometimes requires advance force operations to fulfill the early intelligence requirements

to prepare the battlefield for a larger force to enter the area of operation. Of course, if this option is considered, one must also consider the political implications of failure or compromise. In any case, it is imperative that this intelligence be made available to the lowest levels of execution of SOF operations.<sup>25</sup>

The characteristics and requirements for SOF and especially joint SOF operations are all part of the doctrine presented in the joint pubs. These items must be understood by all the planners whether they be joint, special operations, or conventional. The common ground required for joint special operations is the doctrine produced from experience. Each of the units I observed during the planning of the joint and special operations had standard operating procedures (SOPs) that were usually in tune with the doctrine. However, I cannot remember ever seeing any of these joint documents or manuals on the desks of the planners except for those at the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) where these documents were part of everyone's set of references. This is only an observation from a single source who planned in usually small circles at all levels of these operations, but just having the manuals out during the planning might force one to follow them more closely. Granted, many of the SOPs, such as those at ACOM, were written with the doctrine built in and the staff probably did not require these base documents because this type of planning occurs on a daily basis.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), back of front cover.

<sup>2</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991), iii.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, March 1992), 282.

<sup>5</sup>Joint Pub 1, 7-9.

<sup>6</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), iii.

<sup>7</sup>Joint Pub 3-05.3, iii.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., iv.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., iii.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., IV-7.

<sup>11</sup>bid., IV-4. <sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>The concept of a briefback is generally the same for all services; however, while assigned to JTF 120, I noticed Colonel Schmidt, the Commander of the Special Marine Amphibious Group Task Force (SPMAGTF) called this briefing a "confirmation brief."

<sup>14</sup>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCORD) Handbook (Ft Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, January 1992), front cover.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 27.

<sup>16</sup>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) Handbook (Ft Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 1 February 1994), i-iv.

<sup>17</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine For Army Special Operations Forces (Ft Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 12 December 1991), vii-viii.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., vii.

<sup>19</sup>Joint Pub 3-05.3, III-1.

<sup>20</sup>Joint Pub 3-05, D-1.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., D-1.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., D-2.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., D-2 to D-3.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., D-3.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., D-4.

## CHAPTER 3

### ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN HAITI

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the name for the United States-led, multinational force (MNF) operation supporting the return of President Jean Bertrand Aristide to Haiti. This portion of the overall mission which continues today, began in September of 1994. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY included over 20,000 service men and women from all services including the U.S. Coast Guard and elements of 24 other nations.<sup>1</sup> Because Haiti was within the area of operation of the United States Atlantic Command, the operation was conducted under the command of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) Admiral Paul David Miller, USN.<sup>2</sup>

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin L. Powell, USA, alerted CINCUSACOM on 1 April 1993 for possible contingency operations in Haiti.<sup>3</sup> The potential for U.S. involvement came after a successful overthrow of President Aristide by Lieutenant General Raul Cedras, who led a repressive regime from September 1991 until 19 September 1995.<sup>4</sup> The first military operations began in October 1993 in support of the international embargo by Joint Task Force 120 (JTF 120). This was a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) that increased pressure on Lieutenant General Cedras by ensuring that the embargo in place was observed.<sup>5</sup>

JTF 120 was activated on 16 October 1993 to conduct the MIO and to support a possible Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of American citizens and selected third country nationals in March and

April 1994.<sup>6</sup> The USS Nassau was the command ship with the JTF commander and staff along with a Marine battalion (Special Marine Amphibious Task Force or SPMAGTF), with its regimental staff and helicopters.

When I joined JTF 120, there were about nine ships involved covering about thirteen "boxes" or maritime areas of operation for which each ship was responsible. The ships were rotated from one box to another to cover the entire area of operation depending on the amount of ship traffic in each area. The ships conducted boardings to find contraband and redirected them to other ports outside of Haiti if appropriate.

One of the most important tasks was to begin to build a contingency operations consisting of the emergency extraction of American citizens from the Port-au-Prince area. Special operations units sent planners and pre-positioned important equipment aboard the USS Nassau in order to be able to conduct the NEO, if necessary. The main force of Marines, the SPMAGTF, was capable of conducting the operation as planned with some assistance from special operations forces and had trained specifically for the contingency plan to fly into the assembly area at night and secure the safe extraction of personnel. Although there were several options for the commander to choose from, the Marines were ready to conduct all planned activities and continuously rehearsed and trained for them. This included night flying by the helicopter crews and fast-rope (a technique of sliding down a special rope from a hovering helicopter) infiltration training by the Marines.

The MIO was a strong naval presence and some ship boarding to search for fuel being smuggled into Haiti. Although this strong naval presence was successful at maintaining the restrictions on fuel, the main embargoed item, petroleum products continued to come across the

border from the Dominican Republic by smugglers trying to make a profit.<sup>7</sup> The border of Haiti and The Dominican Republic is not as tight as one might assume. It is easy to cross undetected, especially if the guards on the Haiti side are paid ahead of time with either money or fuel. An educated assumption is that this is what happened after reading the reports of corruption and seeing so much fuel for sale on the streets of Port-au-Prince. The fuel for sale on the city streets was usually in small quantities and sold in containers by the liter/gallon. The small amounts of fuel were easily brought across and fuel was available, if you had money to pay for it.

CINCUSACOM established another JTF on 16 May 1994, in order to conduct migrant interdiction and processing at sea and other specified migrant camp locations. The largest of these sites was at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).<sup>8</sup> This separate JTF was necessary because of the massive exodus of Haitians due to two main reasons. First, many Haitians wanted to escape the repression by Lieutenant General Cedras and his government. Second, ironically the embargo forced the poor people to pay higher prices for fuel smuggled in illegally. Without the fuel many businesses had to close and these people were out of jobs. This embargo had a devastating effect on the population and less effect on Lieutenant General Cedras and his government.<sup>9</sup>

When President Aristide was overthrown in September 1991 the United Nations began its involvement. In October 1993, the UN deployed an advance party of a foreign internal defense (FID) mission led by the U.S. called the Haitian Assistance and Advisory Group (HAAG). This followed the passing of UN Resolution 867 on 23 September 1993 which authorized an expanded mission to support the transition from LTG Cedras to President Aristide.<sup>10</sup> On 14 October 1993 the HAAG arrived in harbor of Port-au-Prince, Haiti aboard the USS Harlan County (LST-1196).

Before debarking any personnel, the ship was turned away by an angry crowd indicating a less than permissive environment for the military advisors.<sup>11</sup> The crowd, many of them "attachés," was heard chanting "Somalia, Somalia." The purpose of chanting this phrase was to remind the observers of the casualties the U.S. Army Rangers had taken in Mogadishu on the third of October, less than two weeks earlier. The extremely violent incident followed a successful but costly direct action (DA) mission by SOF in which helicopters were shot down, U.S. personnel were captured, and others killed during rescue attempts.<sup>12</sup>

As a result, the U.S. began extensive planning for an alternative more aggressive mission in Haiti. CINCUSACOM stood up JTF 180 and JTF 190 to plan and conduct forced entry and other contingency options. These JTF's were formed to meet the requirements of two different operations plans (OPLANS) for more aggressive military operations (OPLAN 2370-95) and permissive entry operations (OPLAN 2380-95).<sup>13</sup>

OPLAN 2370-95 began as a compartmented top secret plan in November 1993 and was submitted to CINCUSACOM for approval on 20 June 1994. This compartmentation will be discussed later in depth because of its implications on the planning by all of the many diverse units involved. It was commonly believed that the top secret compartmentation was due to the President's desire to extend every effort to reach a peaceful settlement politically. Further, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) wanted to conduct prudent planning without any exposure that might undermine the political means of settlement. The plan published was OPLAN 2370-95 with JTF 180 consisting of mainly elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant General Shelton.<sup>14</sup>

In June 1994, OPLAN 2380-95 was written using the crisis action planning process because of the "time compressed environment" for the multinational force option.<sup>15</sup> This operations plan focused on the permissive entry option with a multinational force made up of countries from the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). The two distinct differences between this plan and OPLAN 2370-95 were the accessibility of information for all planners and the rules of engagement that would govern the use of force by the JTF. OPLAN 2380-95 was the JTF 190 option with the main force consisting of elements of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, commanded by Major General Meade.<sup>16</sup>

In Belem, Brazil, on 7 June 1993, the OAS coordinated a plan for after the return of President Aristide, asking the UN Security Council to establish a Multinational Peacekeeping Force to assist Haiti.<sup>17</sup> On 16 June 1993, the Department of State (DOS) authorized the departure of U.S. embassy staff personnel in Haiti, reducing the total number of official embassy personnel from 118 to 75.<sup>18</sup> Five days later, the Pentagon announced the deployment of U.S. personnel along the Haiti and Dominican Republic border under the command of CJTF-120 to broadcast "Radio Democracy" and to reinforce the embargo.<sup>19</sup>

Despite these actions the migrant flow out of Haiti increased and led to CINCUSACOM, on 3 July 1994 to activate the 10th Mountain Division as JTF-190 for planning. On 6 July, the USS Inchon (LPH-12), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), with 2,000 Marines sailed to the Caribbean ready to evacuate U.S. citizens from Haiti. On 12 July, the USS MT Whitney (LCC-20), a SECOND Fleet command ship, sailed for Haitian waters.<sup>20</sup>

The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Madelaine Albright announced on 14 July 1994 that eleven nations had pledged to support

the Multinational Force (MNF) deployment to Haiti once the military junta was removed and President Aristide in place. The next day, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced the Security Council had authorized a coalition force of 15,000 troops to provide peacekeeping in Haiti.<sup>21</sup>

On 20 July 1994, Ambassador Albright asked the UN Security Council to support a U.S. led, multinational force using "all means necessary" to remove Lieutenant General Cedras. The UN authorization to allow the U.S. to use "all means necessary" came in the form of Resolution 940 on 31 July 1994.<sup>22</sup> The USS Wasp (LHA-1) with a SPMAGTF, Caribbean and the ARG arrived in the Haiti area of operations and relieved the USS Inchon (LPH-12) ARG on 11 August, 1994. The mission of the SPMAGTF was to conduct non-combatant evacuation. At this point the U.S. had enough forces in place to conduct all of the planned contingency operations in Haiti. The next major event occurred when the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) ministers announced their support for the now UN approved, U.S. led invasion of Haiti on 30 August 1994.<sup>23</sup> The Vatican was the only state that recognized the coup government.<sup>24</sup>

In September 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry authorized CINCUSACOM to predeploy U.S. forces. This move activated the commanders of both JTF 180 and JTF 190 to execute the combination of OPLANS 2370-95 and 2380-95 which became the "OPLAN 2380 plus (+) option." The support structure for the operation was constructed with the interim support bases (ISB) being established at GTMO and the island of Great Inagua. The deployment of troops began to fill the ISBs and loaded ships that sailed for Haiti. An aircraft carrier, the USS Eisenhower (CV-69), void of its normal payload of fixed wing planes and loaded with various Army and special operations helicopters, sailed for Haiti on 14 September with U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) on board.<sup>25</sup>

CINCUSACOM ordered CJTF 180 to assign the Naval Forces (NAVFOR) commander a SPMAGTF mission in Cap Haitien and both the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), and the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) to supply forces as needed. Once the change of operational control went to CJTF 180, CINCUSACOM directed that CJTF 120 take on duties as CTF 185, which was the naval component for the forced entry option to invade Haiti.<sup>26</sup>

ADM Henry H. Mauz, Jr. CINCLANTFLT, directed an additional aircraft carrier, also void of its normal compliment of aircraft, the USS America (CV-66), to VADM Jay L. Johnson, Commander SECOND Fleet.<sup>27</sup>

The USS America onloaded a Joint Special Operations Task Force, designated Joint Task Force 188, in Norfolk from 10 to 13 September. The America and JTF 188 departed Norfolk on 13 September, in support of OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. JTF 188 was comprised of approximately 2200 personnel from elements of the United States Special Operations Command, Headquartered at Macdill Air Force Base, Florida. USSOCOM forces included elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, US Army Special Operations Command, and the Naval Special Warfare Command. Equipment included standard light weapons, HUMVEES, CH-47 CHINOOK helicopters, several variants of the UH-60 helicopter, and other light observation helicopters. America and JTF 188 were positioned in the Joint Operations Area, off the Haitian coast, until 19 October, when they were ordered home.<sup>28</sup>

While the deployment phase of this operation was underway, President Clinton sent a negotiating team on 16 September. This team was led by former President Jimmy Carter; former CJCS, General Colin Powell; and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The group met with Lieutenant General Cedras in the Presidential Palace trying to persuade him to step down, while the invasion force was enroute.<sup>29</sup>

At precisely 182201Z September 1994, while in GTMO, Cuba, aboard the USS MT Whitney (LCC-20), CJTF 180 was given command of the Joint Operational Area (JOA). CINCUSACOM issued the execute order (EXORD) for OPLAN 2370-95 and set the H hour at 190401Z September 1994, after receiving approval from the National Command Authority (NCA).<sup>30</sup>

As the forces began their final preparations for the invasion, a last minute settlement was reached by the negotiating team and Lieutenant General Cedras for him to step down and eventually leave Haiti. CINCUSACOM ordered the operation to cease and the execution of OPLAN 2380+ option begin.<sup>31</sup> The special operations forces were all set, staged, and ready to execute the assault, but all were recalled.

The nonpermissive options included the 1st and 2nd United States Ranger Battalions were two of the special operations forces earmarked for operations in Haiti. Along with other special operations forces some of them were sent to the USS America (CV-66) to prepare for execution of their mission.<sup>32</sup> The assault was going to be "swift and violent, but probably not too bloody."<sup>33</sup> Although, the enemy was thought to be "decrepit and unmotivated," the huge numbers of aircraft (300-500) flying overhead in a relatively small area was cause for real concern by U.S. commanders of losing troops in midair collisions.<sup>34</sup>

The large numbers of special operations forces in the invasion force made many believe that the SOF was there to hunt down and capture or seize Haitian military leaders. Even though many of the early articles prior to 19 September 1994 speculate why the SOF was there, there was no specific plan to seize the military leaders. This issue was important during that time because U.S. planners were hoping to avoid the previous bad experiences in both Panama and Somalia when commanders became preoccupied with manhunts for specific leaders.<sup>35</sup>

The SOF had specific special operations planned with respect to such things as hostage rescue, NEO, and other missions requiring special skills and equipment. For instance, A Navy sea-land-air (SEAL) team was positioned offshore and postured for a possible hostage rescue mission. Another 39 man SEAL team targeted the Haitian 4th Police Company who were controlling the roads approaching the Presidential Palace. This

attack would have been via Army special operation MH-6 "Little Birds" that are capable of carrying special operation troops strapped to benches outside the cockpit.<sup>36</sup> Other special operations were planned that were generally aimed at getting control of Port-au-Prince within a matter of minutes. At that point they would turn over the targets to the conventional forces for other operations aimed at returning Haiti back to peaceful control of a democratic leader.

Just prior to the invasion, there were special operation C-130 gunships armed with very accurate 105 millimeter howitzers and automatic weapons flying into positions ready to begin firing at targets in Port-au-Prince right at H Hour, 1:00 a.m. 19 September 1994. There were 345 U.S. Army Rangers in six C-141 aircraft preparing to conduct an airborne assault by parachute onto a deserted farm field west of Port-au-Prince to establish a forward operating base for the SOF. Two hundred and thirty five other U.S. Army Rangers were about to fly from their intermediate staging base (ISB), Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into their target Camp d'Application via MH-53J Pave Low Air Force special operations helicopters. This installation was the FAd'H's main threat, a fifty man heavy weapons company equipped with several V-150 Commando armored cars.

Another Ranger element of 480 men was prepared to simultaneously attack the Dessalines barracks located next to the National Palace. This force was already on board the USS America and would fly into their target aboard eight MH-47 "Chinooks" and four MH-60 Black Hawks belonging to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and three other "slick" CH-47s.<sup>37</sup>

The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), made up of special operations forces from the Army, Navy, and Air Force was commanded by Major General Pete Schoomaker and headquartered aboard the USS America. The normal complement of Navy jets were evacuated prior to

the ship departing for Haiti which made room for the 160th SOAR aircraft, U.S. Rangers, and SEAL special operation boats.<sup>38</sup>

Prior to General Schoomaker commanding the JSOTF, Major General William Garrison commanded the element which conducted much of the JSOTF planning that General Schoomaker assumed command of in August 1994.

General Garrison directed the JSOTF initial planning with multiple contingencies and redundancies in as much of the plan as possible.<sup>39</sup>

The planning was extremely important not only for the success of the mission, but for the safety of the special operations troops who would be the first on the ground at all the key targets.

The main targets for the invasion force were the Port-au-Prince International Airport, The National Palace, neighboring Dessalines Barracks, the Haitian 4th Police Company Headquarters, and Camp d'application.<sup>40</sup> These targets and some others were all to be part of the simultaneous takedown by the mainly special operation invasion force. During the planning of this operation I overheard several planners state a little saying which was adopted and used in several briefings that went some thing like this: The key to this operation is synchronicity, and violence of action with spontaneity and simultaneity.

Other keys to the success of this mission and main concerns of the commanders were safety of flight, fratricide, and the capabilities of the FAd'H, in that order.<sup>41</sup> The first time I heard these concerns was when Major General Garrison stated them as his planning concerns at one of the very first planning meetings. His basis for these concerns was real. First, there would be 300 to 500 aircraft simultaneously flying over the small city of Port-au-Prince that would have to be controlled and deconflicted by time and altitude. This aspect of the plan was important and on everyones' mind due to the possibility of an

aircraft going down in a shanty town or some other part of Port-au-Prince. Such an event might present a scenario like the downed aircraft in Somalia, where after a successful SOF direct-action mission, the aircraft was hit and 18 Special Operators were killed, along with 75 wounded.

Second, the targets were in very close proximity of each other. For instance, the Dessalines Barracks and the National Palace were located next to each other. This particular target was planned with several SOF elements shooting at the same time, in many directions, which could pose a threat of fratricide. This was an example of three dimensional fire planning required to prevent stray bullets or soldiers from getting wounded or worse.

Third, the initial response of the FAd'H was unknown. It was relatively certain that the FAd'H would have given up after only a day or two of fighting, at most. However, the initial response was not clear if the FAd'H would hold their positions and fight to their death or flee to the countryside. The state of military preparedness, such as the actual conditions of the weapons and the level of training the FAd'H had, was still in question. Although the intelligence effort was very good, probably one of the best in recent years, information or intelligence is never good enough for commanders and planners.

The organizational structure and planning of this operation was set up or conducted primarily using the joint crisis action planning system because of the unknown mission and time of execution. The separate Joint Task Forces were formed doctrinally because there were separate missions and requirements for different types of forces. Other options for organizing a force exist, such as conducting all of the operations under a single JTF commander and staff or under the Unified Command, in this case Atlantic Command. Due to the uncertainty of the

execution phase of this operation and the size of the elements required, the multiple JTF approach to this operation was the correct option chosen by CINCUSACOM. The multiple JTF force structure seemed to have all of the necessary contingencies planned for with the right mix of forces assigned to each of the tasks.

The importance of the problem and of this background of the Haiti case study has been presented thus far. A view of the SOF doctrine as it related to operations in Haiti and the events, organizational structure, and planning conducted to meet all of the requirements has also been explained. The importance of doctrine in this operation and all others is paramount, if the United States expects success in these very complicated and difficult operations.

In order for the SOF to be successful in any operation, planners as well as commanders should have the necessary doctrine to turn to for planning operations, such as in this case study. Not only do planners and commanders require doctrine, but they require the doctrinal flexibility necessary for successful execution on the battlefield. It is the purpose of this study to indicate whether or not the SOF doctrine used in this operation was appropriate and, therefore, the following analysis of the doctrine and actual planning leads to the answer to this important question.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 2.

<sup>2</sup>Eric Schmitt, "Unique Union of Soldiers and Sailors," The New York Times (17 September, 1994), 6.

<sup>3</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 9.

<sup>7</sup>As a member of the JTF120 staff from 18 October to 23 November 1993, onboard the USS NASSAU (LHA 4), I observed the planning and execution of this joint mission mainly between the U.S. Navy and the Special Purpose Marine Amphibious Task Force (SPMAGTF) for the MIO and other contingency operations. The Army and Air Force maintained LNO's and planners for short periods of time to coordinate planning.

<sup>8</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 2.

<sup>9</sup>I obtained the information regarding the impact of the embargo on Haitians and the Haitian government from a series of informal briefings and coordinations made with the Atlantic Command (ACOM) staff in Norfolk, VA in September through December 1994.

<sup>10</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 6.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>"Attachés" wrongly refers to only members of pseudo-auxiliary police (usually young males) that were used as a strong arm to maintain control in the city streets usually by violence. Attachés were also workers, both men and women, who cooked, worked, or did chores and were "attached," paid or managed by the police.

<sup>13</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 7.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. The purposes of broadcasting "Radio Democracy" via EC-130 were to educate and prepare the Haitians for the U.S. and Multinational military force.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>24</sup>From a reading assignment during classes in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), Adam B. Siegel, "The Intervasion in Haiti," Paper, 2.

<sup>25</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 11.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>28</sup>Inscription from the back of an official photo of the USS America given to the author by a commander within the USSOCOM.

<sup>29</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 12.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ed Offley, "Last Minute Change Puts the Rangers on Hold," Seattle Post-Intelligencer 20 September 1994, 10.

<sup>33</sup>Sean Naylor, "The invasion that never was," Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February 1996, 12.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 12-13. The term "slick" or "vanilla" is sometimes used to distinguish general purpose force equipment or aircraft from special operation or "black" equipment.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 16.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF JOINT AND SOF DOCTRINE IN HAITI

This part of the study will examine joint and SOF doctrine and their use, as well as the organizations and planning of the operations in Haiti. It is now clear that SOF played an important role in the Haiti operations and continues to do so today. Many individuals from many types of units and organizations spent their effort and time to construct the plan. The overall commander of the operation, Admiral Paul Miller, CINCUSACOM, provided the correct command climate and environment to allow all options to be studied with detailed guidance to his staff to accomplish required tasks. Those tasks could only be accomplished successfully if the subordinate commanders had the right resources and doctrine to use in planning their operations.

In military circles, it is commonly known that a commander is responsible for the success or failure of a mission. He is also responsible for what his troops do or fail to do while under his command. But, of utmost importance, it is a commander's duty to provide soldiers with the resources, such as doctrine, standard procedures and guidance as well as sound advice, to accomplish all tasks successfully.

Another one of the key elements in planning this operation was the distinct command influence by CINCUSACOM to allow for the effective integration of SOF at all levels. It was his responsibility to oversee all planning and offer the best plan and organization capable of what would become his forces. He and his staff also had to properly organize his force with the right mix of forces, both special and general

purpose, and assign the appropriate tasks to each. The success of the operation indicates that the integration of SOF was effective and that the subordinate commanders had the guidance and resources necessary to complete their tasks as the missions changed at the last moment.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, states: "These forces (SOF) will be fully integrated into military operations by the combatant commanders."<sup>1</sup> This statement refers to the paragraph in the strategy describing SOF and its unique capabilities to conduct those missions not best suited for conventional or general purpose forces. The strategy also explains that when properly deployed, SOF provides commanders with capabilities, commonly called "combat multipliers," such as extending the commander's vision of the battlefield, increased flexibility, and enhancement of initiative.<sup>2</sup> Although the term "combat multiplier" presumes actual combat it is also used with respect to OOTW. However, it is not the most accurate term for this concept. This sometimes confusing military jargon does not say what it means and does not do what it says and, therefore, in this study the term "combat multipliers" will be changed to "commander's advantages."

The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command had the advantage of SOF at his disposal within his own command. The Special Operations Command (SOC) within ACOM was a major part of the Haiti Assistance and Advisory Group (HAAG) and was the initial planner for the various options. Atlantic Command also had Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) planning and working with the new concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP). ACOM had the requirement to develop and source the concept of AJFP.<sup>3</sup> AJFP was a concept to place packages or groups of forces and equipment, such as task forces forward, prepositioned in

place to increase a commander's flexibility and shorten response time to a given crisis.<sup>4</sup>

Admiral Miller was given the opportunity to test this concept on a crisis in his own AOR with the operations in Haiti. One of the key parts to AJFP in this operation was the positioning of the JSOTF aboard the USS America. Later, the USS Eisenhower and the command ship USS MT Whitney were used with this AJFP concept. Based on the success of this operation, AJFP will probably become the model for the future in crisis response missions.

Although this crisis in the CINC's area of responsibility (AOR) was probably the ideal location to test AJFP, controversy developed when other CINCs of other AORs did not agree that this one type of force packaging was the answer to their particular region of the world. Since there was no doctrine published on the subject up to this time, it was easy to dismiss. As one can see, the requirement for doctrine is important, especially when executing new concepts or trying to portray new techniques to military forces in live operations.

It is presumed that CINCUSACOM based his crisis action planning on the requirements of the mission and the forces available while incorporating the new AJFP concept. Although this seemed like the right road to take towards success, there was no doctrine for the planners to refer to when planning AJFP. Doctrine is dynamic and evolutionary and new doctrine models are required as one of the steps toward developing the doctrine necessary for the forces to be successful on the battlefield or in OOTW. AJFP was not in any doctrinal pubs at the time of its use. Planners had nowhere to turn, there were no publications to refer to except the long drawn out briefings explaining the benefits of AJFP, some of which closely resembled advertisements or sales pitches.

The existing doctrinal framework used a model of combat operations and military operations other than war. This early model shows war as combat but, war might also include noncombat operations.<sup>5</sup> There was no framework in joint doctrine explaining the basic differences between MOOTW and noncombat war. Even the terms OOTW and MOOTW were confusing.<sup>6</sup> The main problem with the doctrine was that the pure definitions of war and combat did not exist.

When discussing or conducting military operations, one should know the difference between war and combat. Is there a real difference? What is the difference? It should be reasonable to assume then that once the term war is properly defined it should logically lead to that which is other than war. However, it is not that simple because U.S. joint doctrine did not define this framework for which it gave guidance. Yet, as mentioned above, this doctrine should be considered the rule for how it conducts war or noncombat or MOOTW or OOTW or any other ambiguous term, hence, the confusion.

The importance of correct terminology is amplified when one begins to plan operations in such MOOTW and joint environments. As seen in Somalia, MOOTW can be violent. When troops get on the ground, problems with such things as rules of engagement and defining exactly what a threat is and to what extent service members can defend themselves all become extremely important. Soldiers are taught in The Command and General Staff College that they always have the right to self defense. What about the ambiguity of what exactly determines a threat to one's life or perceived threats? For instance, if a child should threaten a soldier with a hunting rifle, what clear guidance does a soldier have to act on? Does he shoot? Does he wait and see what develops? Now there is usually clear guidance for situations like this.

It is not perfect, but in combat or in an OOTW environment, there will never be perfect guidance.

In Haiti, there were several color-coded cards written for different situations referring to instructions and rules of engagement for the soldiers to know. This technique was a good mend for the problem. I witnessed the soldiers studying and quizzing each other on different situations with the cards. It seemed that the only challenge for the leaders was trying to make sure that each and every soldier knew what card was in effect for the day or area.

Other than ambiguous terminology, another problem with U.S. joint doctrine is that it is not necessarily adopted by other governmental agencies that the armed forces must deal with in an OOTW or combat environment. Just as in the low intensity conflict (LIC) model of U.S. doctrine, MOOTW and OOTW are not only confusing to the military but, to other agencies as well, such as the Department of State. To take the confusion a step further, when U.S. doctrine is applied with respect to other countries even more problems develop when using the term. LIC was confusing and even contradictory to some countries when discussing LIC in terms of a particular country's survival.<sup>7</sup> In an effort to fix the problem of LIC a new term arose, Military Operations Short of War. Apparently there was no popular pronunciation of the acronym and it never really caught on and was eventually changed to MOOTW.

Another term that went through the same type of evolution was peacekeeping operations, changed to peace support operations. Later this melange of terminology was defined and now there are distinct divisions between peace operations, peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations which implies the enforcement of peace agreements and restoring order. Doctrine, especially MOOTW doctrine

cannot be sufficient with only a listing of neat categories of terms without structure.<sup>8</sup> The unit missions should be based on the functions which should be based upon the services capabilities and charter to fulfill the political goals of the National Command Authority.

Keeping or making peace is a difficult task for any military whether in a Foreign Internal Defense or a counterinsurgency role. The terms that define the roles and missions of the military must be clear and concise not only to the soldiers, but the host nation as well. It is important to note here as opposed to an endnote, that the "United States reserves the right to use force during support to counterinsurgency (part of nation assistance) and during support to insurgency when it is in its best interest to do so."<sup>9</sup>

As stated in chapter 1, joint and SOF doctrine are dynamic and should be flexible enough to meet the challenges of the future. Doctrine should be drafted and tested and revised until those in command are satisfied that the doctrine is written as a tool to assist the planners and commanders who use doctrine. AJFP, as a technique, was written as a briefing, then tested in rehearsals disguised as exercises for operations in Haiti.<sup>10</sup> The concept of AJFP was logical and could be rehearsed in segments by the forces involved. But, the point is that even while planning for the rehearsals, there was no doctrine to review, to plan with, to ensure that the best and safest ways of operating in this new style were the appropriate ways.

It was planning and executing by trial and error and working out problems that developed while on the run that made the operation a success. In after action reviews that I attended following some of these exercises, it was clear to me that it was the quality of the joint and SOF forces involved who performed very well and made AJFP a success, even without doctrine to refer to. Clearly, in the absence of doctrine

or guidance, well trained SOF troops can excel in their mission because of the ability to adapt and the flexibility to overcome deficiencies in various situations.

This was the first time the Army used Navy aircraft carriers as force projection platforms with SOF and other joint and combined forces on board and did so successfully without any specific doctrine use or reference while planning or at least considering; resupply, intelligence flow, command and control considerations, rehearsals, and other planning factors. Instead it was up to the soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen to determine the best way to turn policy into successful action. In this situation and probably in many others, the troops on the ground executed their missions with successful results. Yet, it is the commanders and leaders who owe the troops the guidance and doctrine to refer to that ensures the proper planning procedures and techniques which can eliminate potential failures and capitalize on success.

Another area this study reviews is the effective integration of SOF and joint forces into the JTFs that were formed. The Army provided the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) that in turn provided an ad hoc planning cell, the Joint Operations Planning Group which planned to provide special forces to Task Force RALEIGH. Task Force RALEIGH was formed around 3rd Special Forces Group and was included in OPLAN 2380. The integration of this force during the planning phase of this operation was relatively smooth probably because it had a higher headquarters (USASOC) to coordinate with.

One of the overall coordination problems, planning compartmentalization, did not become a problem at all for SOF to SOF or joint coordinations within the JTF. Although it is necessary to preserve operational security (OPSEC), over-classifying the planning efforts had its adverse outcome on some aspects of the planning,

specifically the permissive entry option.<sup>11</sup> The top secret (TS) security clearance required for access to planning documents was not a problem internal to SOF units because contingency planning is often initially conducted at the TS level and the necessary clearances for planners are maintained for that purpose.

Compartmentalization of the plans seemed to only became a problem when SOF or joint units tried to coordinate with conventional units, such as the XVIII ABN Corps or the 82nd ABN DIV, who did not have all of the necessary planners cleared at the TS level. Compartmentalization of planning also excluded of some interagency coordinations as well. For example, a slide presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili on 21 July 1994 by the CINCUSACOM staff showed several challenges. One of these challenges was to make sure the right agencies and people were informed of the planning efforts to ensure total support. For example, the country team was not included in some planning efforts. At one point, the distribution of the full plan was on hold until further notice and that in view of possible "leaks," an evaluation of the requirement for compartmentation may warrant consideration.<sup>12</sup> However, once this was identified as a potential problem, several meetings were held with the country team to coordinate actions and brief the current planning efforts.

One positive aspect of planning this operation by joint and SOF was that it put into action the doctrine from the 1993 version of FM 100-5 that recently changed from forward defense to force projection in nature. This operational planning seemed to validate the doctrine and in terms of training and readiness applied at many of the new Collective Training Centers focusing now on more joint and SOF integration.<sup>13</sup> In the paper entitled "The Intervasion in Haiti," Adam Siegel, states,

"Successfully integrating the activities of different government agencies remains a challenge for the US government...",<sup>14</sup> thus promoting the idea that the integration of other agencies into joint or SOF doctrine will be difficult and have its own set of problems and challenges that must be overcome as many of them were in Haiti.

Another positive aspect of the planning of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the forming of the JTF from both the corps and division headquarters. This use of an existing headquarters had many advantages. The staff is familiar with each other and have established working relationships, thus reducing the learning curve.<sup>15</sup> In fact it worked so well that the JTF commander was able to designate the JTF staff with an additional task of staffing the Army Force (ARFOR) staffing requirements. This did away with the ARFOR commander and staff and worked well because the predominance of Army forces were within the JTFs.<sup>16</sup> This is an example of how to use doctrine to the commander's advantage and not follow it word for word, but allow doctrine to portray the base for creative organizing and efficiency.

Although this study does not focus on civil affairs (CA) or psychological operations (PSYOP), the importance of two aspects of these units is worth a short review. First, the close integration of CA and PSYOP reserve forces into the invasion plan was apparent. Elements of both active and reserve units were on board aircraft ready to conduct the parachute assault integrated with the JTF forces. It is normal for active CA and PSYOP forces to conduct the initial tasks of assessment which lead to the deployment of reserve forces. In this case the forces were together which led to the second aspect of CA and PSYOP units the study will mention, command and control. The integration of these forces did not prove to be a problem except for the question of who was

in charge. This was resolved when the CA Brigade commander was placed in charge.<sup>17</sup>

Other problems of this nature developed later in the operation with respect to PSYOP units which generally worked in teams closely with the Special Forces A-teams. One can see the potential for difficulty if a PSYOP unit is out in the country with a SF A-team, under the security of, and supported by the A-team, that even if or when the A-team had tactical control (TACON) (the authority to task within specific missions) of the PSYOP unit, the difficulty in tasking the PSYOP units would become an issue from a command and control perspective. This is because even though doctrinally it is correct, under TACON to task the unit, a SF A-team is not able to replicate the experience or training of a PSYOP commander and staff that plans and executes the missions. The best tactical use of these units then might be to work out a relationship in which the PSYOP unit is tasked by senior PSYOP officers instead of SF officers on an A-team.

Although the multiple JTF structure was effective, it required a great number of planners and staff personnel leading to some obvious inefficiencies. The compartmented planning process provided for insufficient coordination as mentioned above. It became most problematic when the shift from a forceful entry to a peaceful entry was ordered. Changes in troop movements and command and control had to be coordinated and the pure numbers of staffs and personnel made this difficult. Over 1,500 personnel were committed to command and control (not counting higher-level headquarters) between the two JTFs.<sup>18</sup>

It is clearly a doctrinal rule to conduct operations with a streamlined, efficient command and control and staff structure to conduct operations, not just joint and SOF operations. The challenge of a large coordinating effort is a case of planners and commanders not

following the doctrine that exists. This problem is not so apparent in the JSOTF and units under the JSOTF. The JSOTF units and staff structure were similar to the structure used in Somalia and Panama, which follows joint and SOF doctrine in Joint Pub 3-05.<sup>19</sup> Although there are some who argue there may be better ways to conduct these operations from a structural standpoint, most of the lessons learned have been corrected and the JSOTF seems to be the most efficient way to conduct these types of operations within a JTF.

Conducting command and control of a large force with a large staff on board a Navy aircraft carrier poses some of its own problems. Again, there is no current doctrine on the use of Navy C4I platforms, such as the USS MT Whitney or USS America, supporting Army JTFs.<sup>20</sup> This should be part of our joint and SOF doctrine including training, support considerations, embarking and debarking operations, special communications equipment (cables and antennas) and other important aspects of JTF operations. Each SOF unit had its own set of problems from aviation units not being able to use frequency modulation (FM) frequencies with the ship because the ship does not have enough space to set up a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) with all of its unique OPSEC requirements on board a ship.<sup>21</sup> Planners relied on predeployment surveys of space and communication requirements, such as laying cables from office spaces to the antennas topside. Doctrinal references and manuals might have saved time, money, and space.

One of the doctrinal reasons for forming a JTF is to execute missions having specific, limited objectives of short duration by elements of two or more services.<sup>22</sup> Although there are several examples of long standing JTFs with multiple missions, such as in Honduras and Panama. Therefore the problems, concerns, or "observations" that the commander of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (a JTF

in all but the name, part of JTF 190), briefed should not have existed by the strict sense of the definition by doctrine. However, he stated that he was concerned with the wide variety of tasks including security operations, airfield operations, port operations, logistic operations, garrison operations, civil military operations (CMO) projects, information campaign, and family support group activities.<sup>23</sup>

By this information alone it is clear that two things are evident. First, that this commander has been tasked with entirely too many tasks for his force to conduct well by his assessment, according to doctrine. In this case it seems that the JTF has overtasked this force and, therefore, is not following doctrinal guidelines of limited objectives. If this is to be the trend or SOP in the future, doctrine must change or at least review the definition of JTF and its purpose. Apparently, there is a disconnect with what doctrine says and what occurred in Haiti.

I did not note an overtasking problem during any of the joint, SOF briefings or meetings I attended while planning this operation. It was however, evident from my observations that there would be, as in any SOF operation, a string of contingencies such as combat search and rescue (CSAR) that required preparation and planning by the JSOTF elements in addition to the specified mission taskings, but these are not uncommon.

Although deep strikes were not part of the mission in Haiti, my review of Joint doctrine did not find a clear description of how joint planners address the problem of linking the forward air missions flown by the Air Force and the SOF elements on the ground, usually the ones who call for the strikes. There appears to be a distinct void in joint doctrine describing the process of getting the call for fire from the teams out front in the deep battle to the actual aircraft. It seems

that in Haiti, the SOF community was very comfortable with the AC-130 gunships and other support available to fire at the high payoff or key targets. The AC-130 gunship is an asset to SOF that is routinely trained with and is accurate enough to be used in an urban environment, where target discrimination is critical. This could be an important challenge to future operations having deep or strategic targets being reported by SOF forces conducting special reconnaissance. The process will require timely communications and clear procedures to ensure quick response and accurate fires. This topic was raised in the 1996 exercise PRAIRIE WARRIOR, an advanced warfighting experiment allowing twenty-first century leaders to train with and gain insights from the employment of future weapon systems equipment, organizations, and technologies through simulation.<sup>24</sup>

The last major doctrinal change, or as some call it "revolution," came after the Grenada operation and the perceived failures of the armed forces in LIC and special operations.

"Grenada pushed the major Department of Defense Reorganization Act, known for its sponsors as Goldwater-Nichols, which caused, over time, major changes in joint operations."<sup>25</sup> The Act did two distinct changes. First, it made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principle advisor to the President which greatly increased his influence. Second, it created the "combatant command" (COCOM) relationship that provided CINCs of unified commands with the ability to give specific missions and task organization to conduct the mission.<sup>26</sup> The Goldwater-Nichols Act redefined jointness in the United States military.

Another significant piece of legislation that helped form the doctrine we use today is the Cohen-Nunn Amendment. This amendment created a new unified command, the United States Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM) to control Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF. The CINC of USSOCOM would command the specific employment of SOF even though he was a supporting CINC.<sup>27</sup> As a result of this Act the new CINC General James Lindsay conducted a Joint Missions Analysis (JMA) to determine exactly what requirements the CINCs of the other unified commands were and how to best fulfill the nature of his mission.<sup>28</sup>

All of these things and others are the beginnings of the current doctrine we now have and the doctrine that the planners had to conduct the operations in Haiti. These examples show how doctrine, with top-down emphasis, through the use of legislation, guides and helps determine the joint and SOF future way of fighting wars and conducting operations other than war. The operations in Haiti had the doctrine necessary in most cases to plan and execute the operations including such new techniques such as AJFP. The doctrine was in fact present for much of the joint and SOF operations. It was ready for use, except for the few existing voids discussed in this thesis, to those who would use it.

After researching and interviewing many participants on the topic of using doctrine, it is my belief that many of the books and manuals were simply not opened during the planning of the Haiti operations, never mind studied or used. This in itself is alarming. After one looks at the importance of doctrine and the impact it receives from the president on down through military channels and the impact it has on molding the future of U.S. armed forces structure, it appears that not reviewing doctrine to plan an invasion is absolutely wrong. But, although the doctrine may not have been opened or reviewed, in a sense it was present in planning.

Many of those who I interviewed stated that, generally, the use of doctrine was through standard operating procedures (SOPs). SOPs are

unit internal documents that reflect doctrine in standard practices and techniques that should be used. This is an important fact because my study was conducted by researching the Army level doctrine for joint and SOF forces. I did not specifically target SOPs for my research. The SOPs should be based on doctrine and are specific to the unit, therefore not usually subject to review by higher levels of the military for content. It is only during exercises or real-world operations when the SOPs become exposed to the other units of the joint and SOF community for planning and during execution. Therefore, the SOPs become a form of doctrine in a sense, as long as they are consistent with the broader scope doctrinal manuals and publications. For what I have seen during this operation, most of the SOPs are consistent and valid. It is therefore true that the doctrine available was used by the planners, just in a form more useful to the planners.

One of the most interesting findings in the research has been the doctrinal manuals themselves. Most are more than a couple years old. Most are broad and not specific enough in many cases. However, one publication that is not technically doctrine stands out. The most important document found concerning the planning of the operations in Haiti and joint doctrine, is the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993. This document is the primary teaching document at the AFSC and is used to prepare mid-career and senior officers for duty in the joint arena. It is also the primary publication for the joint professional military education (JPME) which is taught in phases. Phase I is taught in the Service schools and Phase II is taught at AFSC.<sup>29</sup> This publication is one that presents the overall view of the dynamic process of joint operations and planning. AFSC Pub I has a very extensive glossary in

Appendix I that makes this document one of the best military references available.

Although the doctrine is written in most cases, there needs to be a refinement and revision that updates the techniques, tactics, and procedures for joint and SOF operations, planning and training. Most of the manuals or publications are outdated. U.S. doctrine has been changing and the new lessons learned from operations like that in Haiti must be written in doctrine.

As stated above, the AJFP technique seemed to test well in Haiti and may work well again for ACOM during a different operation. The lessons learned should be placed in doctrine and taught as part of the joint military education system so it can be used again or at least studied. If it is not to be used again then that should be on record for others to study and possibly modify so it can be successful in the future or in other theaters. There should be something like the JMA that was formed to formally study and find out exactly what the requirements were before doctrine was changed. The AJFP could have had and may still yet warrant a full study to determine the impact on U.S. current doctrine, after the results of operations in Haiti.

Command and control is still not fixed with respect to CA and PSYOP. Haiti was another test for trying to figure out exactly what the relationship between the CA, PSYOP, and SF teams should be. Who should work for whom? Who should have tasking authority over whom? Where does CA, PSYOP and SF (all part of the SOF community) fit in the overall SOF picture? It seems there is a solid benefit to have the CA and PSYOP teams colocated with the SF A-teams, but are they attached? Should they be assigned? Who supplies the communications package to get the CA reports back to the rear when they are forward deployed with the A-team?

All of these are important issues and require continued work to resolve the issues.

Doctrine was not followed exactly on many occasions during the operations in Haiti. However, SOPs played an important role with respect to doctrine. This shows that commanders are following doctrine and using it as a general rule describing how to fight or operate and are still maintaining the flexibility to construct (within the guidelines of doctrine) a subset of rules that incorporate the commanders techniques and style. The commander uses the SOPs just as if they were doctrinal publications to train, plan, and execute his operations. In the case of these operations in Haiti, the SOPs seemed to work as well as doctrine.

The last point of this chapter brings up an interesting issue of the doctrinal publications. It seems odd that one of the key doctrinal publications is not in fact, doctrine. AFSC Pub 1 is a textbook used in the education of the joint officers who will be planning and commanding in the next operation. It only makes sense that if the document is good enough to be used as a text to teach our mid-career officers about the joint world of military operations, it might as well be doctrine.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 15.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) J5, Special Planning Group, entitled "CINCUSACOM Actions" (briefing slide, Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995).

<sup>4</sup>From several briefings that I attended in ACOM and other headquarters in 1994, my understanding of Adaptive Joint Packaging is that it is a concept of placing a joint force, much like a JTF or JSOTF together, possibly on a ship or group of ships to increase a commanders' advantage of flexibility, surprise, shortened response time and provide a platform for planning, rehearsing, and executing a crisis mission.

<sup>5</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1990), GL-6.

<sup>6</sup>Ann E. Story and Aryea Gottlieb, "Beyond the Range of Military Operations," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1995). 98.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 100.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 101.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>"KNIGHTLY ROGUE" was the name of one such exercise I participated in that tested and rehearsed several of the Adaptive Joint Force Packaging techniques prior to the deployment of forces to Haiti.

<sup>11</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, see "Executive Summary," Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Initial Impressions report of the opening phase of the Operation (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command), 1.

<sup>12</sup>United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) J5, Special Planning Group, entitled "CINCUSACOM Actions" (briefing slide, Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995).

<sup>13</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Initial Impressions report of the opening phase of the Operation (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command), 2.

<sup>14</sup>Adam B. Siegel, "The Intervasion in Haiti," from a reading assignment during classes in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), Paper, 53.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>18</sup>Siegel, 52.

<sup>19</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint PUB 3.05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 February 1992), III-1. This doctrinal pub would have been the one available for use by joint and special operations forces during the planning of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

<sup>20</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Initial Impressions report of the opening phase of the Operation (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command), 50.

<sup>21</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Initial Impressions report of the opening phase of the Operation (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command), 16.

<sup>22</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993), 4-4.

<sup>23</sup>2-10th Mountain Division, see "The 2d Brigade Combat Team" (briefing slides, Fort Drum, NY: 2-10th Mountain Division, 1994).

<sup>24</sup>PRAIRIE WARRIOR 1996 was an advanced warfighting experiment largely conducted at Fort Leavenworth, KS by members of the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) train and experiment with future technologies and organizations by computer simulation systems. In several of the after action reviews I attended, it was clear that a void exists in doctrine explaining the process by which high payoff targets are spotted by SOF, reported, and eventually fired upon by strategic fires, usually deep strike aircraft.

<sup>25</sup>John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night" in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 4, No.3, (Winter 1995). 389.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 390.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 392.

<sup>29</sup>Armed Forces Staff College, Pub 1, "The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993" (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), iii,

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

The research for this thesis has uncovered many challenges for the joint and SOF community. The review of doctrine and my participation in the planning and execution of the operations in Haiti sparked an interest that will undoubtedly lead to more work on the subject. The problems generally exist in the doctrine itself and the use of doctrine. Both of these aspects of how the joint and SOF fights or operates are extremely important not only in winning the battle or saving lives, but in how the interpretation of doctrine will influence the future of the military.

The challenge leaders have today is not only to focus on the importance of the missions and operations now, but expand the thought process and look forward into the future. One must try and anticipate how the doctrine will work in the future with changing political, economic, and social attitudes. One should also try and view how military leaders will continue to satisfy the political goals and how that fits with politicians trying to satisfy the economic and social attitudes of the people. There should be a nesting of doctrine with the way military operations are conducted and the political goals and vision.

This study has determined was that the doctrine that existed during the planning of the operations in Haiti was adequate to

accomplish the missions of the JTFs and to plan for most if not all of the contingencies. Simply stated: the joint and SOF doctrine were appropriate for what was generally needed. However, this study has also determined several voids in doctrine: namely the absence of doctrine on AJFP; useable rules of engagement doctrine; generally clear terminology for post cold war military operations (especially in the joint and OOTW doctrine); and the concept of how to provide command and control and other battlefield operating systems with multiple JTFs within a single target country.

Doctrine also failed to provide the required guidance on how to conduct planning with multiple service elements and JTFs involved, while the planning information remained in a compartmented cell. Doctrine does not, nor did it, provide guidance on how to properly integrate multiple interagency functions and agencies into the military mission. This is one area that cannot be conducted successfully without planners having the proper documents and education on how to integrate the United States and multinational organizations so that they can become advantages for any commander on the ground.

The positive aspects of the operations in Haiti with respect to doctrine were that the commanders showed how they could work with the existing doctrine and remain flexible and create multiple JTFs and actually pull the staffs from their own headquarters to ensure efficiency. This reduced the learning curve normally associated with putting a new staff together from many different units with different SOPs. Another aspect of the operations is that doctrine will be reviewed and hopefully rewritten to incorporate the command and control

issues associated with SOF, specifically CA, PSYOP, and SF. The joint doctrine should be updated to incorporate AJFP and possibly form a JMA to review the tactics, techniques, and procedures of using a force projection platform for SOF, for instance.

The last several major engagements the United States has conducted show that JTFs are a quick and efficient way of projecting force or military presence into a situation that requires military response. U.S. doctrine and military education system should reflect this technique and exploit our successes. Currently, a limited amount of time is spent at the CGSOC on JTF operations. It seems that the successful JTF commanders have commanded several JTFs and gain their experience by trial and error, of course, many of the same lessons have been learned earlier in other commands. But, JTFs are different every time they operate, different intelligence structures, different communications links, different platforms to operate from. Somewhere, JTF operations should be taught, in detail, to the staff officers and commanders of future JTFs. First, the doctrine should be formed, tested, trained, and then implemented in military operations.

The doctrine should protect against such problems that may arise like the overtasking of a force. It should spell out clear and concise steps to deconflict things like air assets and fires, SOF, and other long range surveillance units. This research does not lead to the extreme, dictating a new revolution in doctrine, but it is time to capture the events and techniques learned from such operations as in Haiti. SOF current doctrine, four or five years old in some cases,

requires updating. SOF equipment, and capabilities are changing along with the joint community. Better communications technology and better trained people can be extremely effective with the right kind of guidance and doctrine to have as a base to begin. The rest is up to the imagination and good confident leadership.

One key lesson learned in every war or combat situation is that of safety. The people of the U.S. have a right to expect that commanders will do their best to ensure the safety of troops when possible. "Reducing the risk of friendly fire incidents that marred the 1991 Gulf War was a high priority for the planners in Atlantic Command and at Fort Bragg."<sup>1</sup> While planning the operations in Haiti, planners had to incorporate a sense of safety and ensure that the risk of fratricide was as low as possible. Soldier safety is one area in doctrine where, although it is not described in an overall joint or SOF safety publication, it was emphasized in every aspect of every plan. This is another area where doctrine could be improved. The issue is very much related to the deconfliction of airspace and fire coordination mentioned above.

One reason that safety was so emphasized was that at one point there would be between 300 and 500 military aircraft flying over the small city of Port-au-Prince.<sup>2</sup> Joint doctrine may be able to ensure the coordination takes place in a timely manner and guide staff officers into planning a sound, deconflicted environment in which to fight.

The joint and SOF doctrine reviewed for the preparation of this thesis is generally sound. There is a void in doctrine, as discussed earlier, that should be addressed to allow commanders and planners to

conduct the best possible operations with the tools required. Doctrine should also address the constraints of time, money, ground truth intelligence, and the political goals showing how these can impact on planning. The doctrine is, therefore, suitable for operations, such as those that occurred in Haiti, but there must be emphasis on the training with and teaching of the doctrine. This is a difficult task due to the dynamic nature of the military and the doctrine.

As shown above, the senior leadership of the military is very much involved in taking doctrine into the future. Looking ahead into the future and keeping up with the changing environments and world situations are extremely important. Having a fighting force that is trained and ready to fight is also very important. It is one key ingredient that helps maintain readiness and guides the techniques and equipment requirements and that is doctrine. As long as the generals have the desire to improve and do more with less and become more efficient, the threats will be met. Haiti proved that in a relatively short period of time the United States could organize a force, use the force as a threat, and at the very last moment change in midstride and change the option to one of much less violence to accomplish some of the same tasks.

The research conducted in Haiti, particularly the interviews conducted and the site surveys conducted in and around the Port-au-Prince area, was beneficial and rewarding. The United States as part of the multinational force has done extremely well considering the missions ordered to conduct. There will always be better ideas or better ways to conduct similar operations in the future, but they start with the

doctrine. If the SOF and joint doctrine remain dynamic and the conventional as well as the SOF and joint community can understand and use the doctrine effectively, there is no doubt that other operations like Haiti will be performed efficiently and effectively.

This study looked at the events in the operation, the doctrine used or not used to plan the operation, the new and innovative techniques that worked well, and others that are still not sufficiently sound. The study keyed on lessons learned type of issues, but only to express the answer to the thesis question on appropriateness of SOF doctrine. Future doctrine rests with past operational experience. Operations in Haiti were a success, and it is important to capture the lessons learned and prepare future doctrine with them in mind and with the goal of not making the mistakes others have, whatever they may be.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was, Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February, 1996, 16.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

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#### Interviews

Interviews were conducted with well over 40 members of the armed forces and civilians in the Port-au-Prince area in February 1996 by myself, John T. Fishel, Ph.D., and Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., during a research visit. I chose not to cite any of the persons interviewed, although all are recorded and awaiting transcription. I used the information from all of these points of view to provide an extensive wealth of knowledge as a background to better understand the environment in Haiti during the planning, execution, and withdrawal of forces, which I used to form my points and conclusions.

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
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
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